Since the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force in 2009, the Common & Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) retains its intergovernmental character, although its legal status is no longer separate from but part of a single European Union (EU) framework. With particular focus on the United Kingdom's practice as a EU member state, this article examines the potential pressures which bear on the interplay between: (i) the CFSP's intergovernmental character; and (ii) the CFSP's current legal status within a single EU framework that established a semblance of institutional coherence; and (iii) the implications for conducting the UK's foreign relations, a consequence of its status at international law as an independent sovereign state. The article argues that pressures arise for the UK because of its legal obligations under UK law, EU law and international law, which potentially interlock, as distinct sources of law, with consequences for the flexible conduct of British foreign relations. This argument is illustrated through the case study of accession by the UK and EU (of which the UK is a member state), two separate legal persons at international law, to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a matter of international law, one conclusive criterion of an entity's statehood (i.e., the legal status of being a state) is defined by its independent ability to conduct foreign relations with other subjects of international law.
1 That a common and not single European foreign policy exists, in an intergovernmental form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 2 is a reflection of two realities. 3 The one is that member states of the European Union (EU) intend, as independent sovereign states, to conduct their own foreign relations. The other is that a single European foreign policy is an unrealistic prospect, 4 despite and because of institutional tinkering in the Treaty of Lisbon 5 to give a semblance of coherence to the CFSP. It is only the fusion of sovereign states and dissolution of their separate embassies, armies, treaty relations with other subjects of international law and memberships of the United Nations to form a single (federal) state, which give substance to a single European foreign policy. 6 The CFSP had developed innovatively and pragmatically since its modest start as the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. 7 As the European Community's (EC) common commercial policy matured, so the need for a coherent negotiating approach on related matters such as foreign policy grew. 8 Thus began the EPC as a political process, outside the EC framework, although its discreteness gradually became less evident, as member states drew upon EC competences to address the foreign policy pursuits in EC policies. 9 Then, in the Treaty of Maastricht (on which the CFSP was created to replace the EPC) 10 and Treaty of Amsterdam, 11 the Council 12 and European Council 13 were granted particular competences in incremental fashion to act in CFSP matters. member states to refrain from unilateral acts which are deleterious to the international actions of the EU. 20 Second, it requires cooperation from member states to ensure unity in the international representation of the EU on the international plane. 21 A specific duty of cooperation concerning CFSP matters now exists in Article 24(3) TEU, enjoining its member states to develop political solidarity whose actions shall not impair EU effectiveness as a "cohesive force in international relations."
These developments reflect a semblance but are not conclusive of institutional coherence concerning the CFSP's position within a single EU framework. This is because the CFSP's intergovernmental character is still evident, in at least three ways. First, both constituent instruments, the TEU or TFEU, conspicuously and explicitly omitted mention of the supremacy of EU law 22 concerning CFSP matters. Second, compared to other EU competences, the CFSP's competence within this single EU framework is not expressly enumerated in the TFEU as exclusive, shared or complementary. 23 Indeed, under Article 40 TEU, all EU competences are protected from CFSP competence and vice versa. 24 Third, the exclusion of the Court of Justice of the European Union's (CJEU) jurisdiction in CFSP matters further underscores its structural distinctiveness as an intergovernmental activity. 25 In short, CFSP matters involve "high policy" and are conducted through cooperation between governments of EU member states, i.e., an intergovernmental act conducted within a single EU framework but whose legal status in relation to the supremacy of EU law is left unresolved.
To complicate matters, there is a wider perspective to consider in the form of EU external action. 26 The CFSP forms a part of 27 and operates within a wider legal framework of EU external action on the international plane. 28 The overarching objectives of EU external action and the CFSP are distinct yet related 29 and subject to Part Five of the TFEU. 30 This statement requires some explanation. Because EU external action and the CFSP are conceptually distinct but in reality related, we must look to the overarching objectives in the TEU to ascertain their meaning. Article 21(2) TEU contains a set of overarching objectives for EU external action; these clearly include areas such as development cooperation and humanitarian aid. 31 Yet, some overarching objectives of EU external action are specifically at the heart of CFSP matters (preservation of peace, for example). 32 Other overarching objectives of EU external action, for instance the promotion of human rights, overlap with CFSP matters in a cross-sectoral manner. 33 Finally all these objectives are subject to Part Five TFEU that contains provisions on specific areas of EU external action such as a common commercial policy, for which the EU has exclusive 20 Ruling 1/78, re Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Weapons, Facilities and Transports, 1978 E.C.R. 2151. 21 See Opinion 2/91, re Convention No 170 of the ILO, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061, paras. 36-38. 22 I.e., EU law is supranational and neither determined nor confined by national laws of member states. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1. The CFSP's implementation "shall not affect the application of the procedures and extent of the powers of the institutions" in the exercise of the EU's competences. Arts. 3-6 TFEU. 25 Art. 275 TFEU. See infra Sections II and V for discussion of potential exceptions. 26 As defined under the heading of Tit. V TEU, which states: "general provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy" [ competence to act. 34 Since the objectives of EU external action and the CFSP can overlap in a cross-sectoral manner, few subjects are likely to be purely CFSP matters. In short, CFSP matters can potentially be subject to EU law, despite its structural distinctiveness as an intergovernmental activity.
35
The CFSP's current form in the Lisbon Treaty is a result of diplomatic negotiations, more an afterthought and much less an outcome of deliberate planning. We now know, Against this background, this article draws attention to the potential pressures which bear on the interplay between: (i) the CFSP's intergovernmental character; (ii) the CFSP's current legal status within a single EU framework that established a semblance of institutional coherence; and (iii) the implications for EU member states when they conduct their foreign relations, as a consequence of their legal status at international law as independent sovereign states. To this extent, this article particularly examines the recent actions of one member state: the United Kingdom. Long a reluctant European since its accession to the EC, the UK entered late but is a member state of some importance. 41 Of late, it has appeared increasingly disaffected with the EU. 42 The British Government has promised the prospect of a "new settlement" for the UK's membership in the EU through a referendum by 2017, subject to significant qualifications. 43 The government's recent actions illustrate its national response as a EU member state to the pressures brought about by enmeshing the CFSP's intergovernmental character, which is still conducted as an aspect of the UK's independent foreign policy, with stronger expectations of the CFSP being conducted within the (apparent) institutional coherence of a single EU structure.
Accordingly, the article examines these pressures through three distinct -but relatedquestions, with special reference to the practice both of the EU and UK concerning its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC): 44 1. Despite a semblance of institutional coherence, how does the intergovernmental character of the CFSP manifest itself as an aspect of the UK's independent conduct of its foreign relations? 2. Because there is a semblance of institutional coherence, what is the nature of the CFSP in normative terms when it is applied to Southeast Asia, a geographical zone which is far away from the EU? 3. What are the implications for the UK's conduct of foreign relations as an independent sovereign state with Southeast Asia because the CFSP's intergovernmental character is now enmeshed with requirements of (apparent) institutional coherence within the EU? Arts. 3(1)(e), 4(4) TFEU. 35 Art. 24(1) TEU (which provides for the CFSP's "specific rules and procedures" which are agreed by the European Council and Council on the basis of unanimity). 36 The academic approach in this article is largely doctrinal. Therefore, it identifies primary sources of national (i.e., UK) EU and international law, explains the connection in the rules and principles between these apparently disparate sources of law, analyses the areas of difficulties, and predicts future developments.
Section II explains the CFSP's intergovernmental character in UK law. Two case studies are instanced here to show how the CFSP's intergovernmental character is manifested as an aspect of British foreign policy, nearly five years after the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force. As a matter of national (UK) law, British foreign relations are conducted by the government as the executive organ of state. The government's actions in these areas are considered matters of "high policy," a "forbidden territory," which is generally non-justiciable before the UK courts. 45 This is the context to understand the CFSP's legal status (as a matter of EU law) within UK laws. Because the CFSP is still an intergovernmental activity, it is properly the British government which continues to dominate the implementation of a common European foreign policy. Pressures arise because of EU's plans to improve its international effectiveness as a cohesive force in CFSP matters, which are more ambitious but also more ambiguous. More ambitious because EU member states are legally obliged in the constituent instruments to promote EU actions on the international plane, but which would normally involve areas belonging to a "forbidden territory" under UK law. More ambiguous because the CFSP, despite the EU's ambitions within this single framework which has a semblance of institutional coherence, is still an intergovernmental act that recognises the independence of EU member states, like the UK, to conduct its own foreign relations as sovereign states. Despite the convergence of ambition and ambiguity, within the UK the CFSP is still conducted as an aspect of British foreign relations and dominated by the British Government, at the increasing expense of Parliament and the courts. The two case studies in this section aim to demonstrate the general and somewhat conceptual approach by the government towards the CFSP.
In contrast, Section III uses as a case study the parallel accession to the TAC by the UK and EU, two legal persons as separate parties to this treaty, to illustrate the specific approach of the British Government in conducting the CFSP as an aspect of the UK's foreign relations. The British Government views the CFSP as a diplomatic multiplier of and not constraint to conducting British foreign relations with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) more effectively. 46 The parallel accession is a particular example of how the government addressed the pressures of balancing the CFSP's intergovernmental character with the added demands of conducting CFSP coherently within a single institutional framework of the EU. This case study further exemplified the government's dominance of the process, in contrast to Parliament's participation, which culminated in the UK's accession to the TAC, at the bilateral (with Southeast Asia as a region) and multilateral (EU) level.
Section IV explores the potential interlocking of UK law, EU law and international law which results from the parallel accession by the UK (as an EU member state and sovereign state) and predicts potential areas of difficulties for the UK's independent exercise of its foreign relations. It uses the EU restrictive measure against Myanmar as a case study to demonstrate the connection between the three sources of law. Additionally, I also argue that the CFSP, as applied to geographical zones afar such as Southeast Asia, is principally a normative exercise aimed at projecting "liberal-meliorist," 47 European values that reflect a particular view of international relations, which it encourages in other states outside the EU as worthy of wider application.
II. THE CFSP'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL CHARACTER WITHIN THE UK
A. Legal status of the CFSP within UK law As an intergovernmental activity, the conduct of the CFSP is firmly confided to the government under its prerogative of foreign relations 48 -a collection of residual, undefined and discretionary monarchical powers that had over time passed to the executive branch. 49 But it is first necessary to state the legal status of EU law in UK law. The general position is that EU law is supreme in the UK and prevails over UK laws that are inconsistent with it -a statement which it is necessary to clarify. This constraint on the sovereignty of the UK as an independent state was accepted by Parliament through implementing legislation, the European Communities Act 1972 (1972 Act).
50 EU law is not entrenched in UK law because it is supreme. 51 It is supreme because of incorporation, dependent on the continuing statutory basis of the 1972 Act.
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In contrast, any provision that is related or can be applied to CFSP matters in the Lisbon Treaty are expressly excluded in Section 1(2)(s) of the 1972 Act. Qualitatively, CFSP matters are insulated from the supremacy of EU law, lack a domestic foothold in UK law and consequently are not directly enforceable. 53 The UK's legal obligations in CFSP matters exist "out there," on the international plane. In short, these are international legal obligations, for which the UK is bound by the government's actions under the prerogative of foreign relations.
Successive British governments have scrupulously preserved the CFSP's intergovernmental character by carving it out from EU law -where its supremacy as a doctrine bites -at least within UK law in the 1972 Act. It is on this basis that CFSP matters formed an aspect of the government's prerogative in foreign relations. It is because of this basis that CFSP matters are still recognised by Parliament and the courts as broadly part of a "forbidden territory" and therefore non-justiciable. This view still obtains after the Lisbon Treaty's institutional attempts to integrate CFSP matters more coherently within a single EU framework. And it is this change at the EU level, which throws into relief the relative inability (and willingness) of Parliament and the courts, to induce its government to account for potential implications of the pressures being exerted on the CFSP, as an intergovernmental activity within a single and (apparently more) institutionally coherent EU framework.
B. Case Study 1: Review of the balance of competences between the UK and EU 2012 (2012 Review) 
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The Government's recent actions laid bare its institutional advantage in conducting foreign relations at the expense of Parliament and the courts. These were calibrated concessions to improve public accountability of its actions. Some correlation between form and emphasis are apparent in the Government's actions under examination in this section: just as it emphasised the CFSP's potential for competence creep in UK law, so the legal form on which it bore emphasis is weaker.
In its 2012 Review, the government: (i) defined "competence" as "everything deriving from EU law that affects what happens in the UK"; 55 (ii) acknowledged the CFSP's potential competences as "wide-ranging"; 56 and (iii) intimated that in CFSP matters the balance of competences would be actively influenced by the CJEU. 57 But this Review was only an analytical exercise. At the time of writing this is an ongoing -and comprehensive -assignment to appraise the consequences of UK membership since its admission to the EC in 1973 . 58 The government stressed that policy recommendations or alternative models of British relations with the EU are not expected to ensue from this Review. 59 The collected evidence (certainly in Foreign Policy) was scrupulously presented as "signposts," without prejudice to future actions that the government might adopt. In other words, the CFSP is regarded as one of various diplomatic tools at the UK's disposal to facilitate the conduct of British foreign relations. It is a multiplier of but not substitute for British interests. This concern was preponderant in the evidence that was collected for the Foreign Policy 62 and Development Reports of July 2013. 63 Both Reports emphasised the political and diplomatic outcome, for the UK, of conducting its foreign relations within the institutional framework of the CFSP and EU external action. 64 Where CFSP matters overlapped with EU external action -for instance, restrictive measures against Myanmar and Iran -unanimity at the European Council was required. 65 Against both states, the UK's foreign relations carried greater (moral) authority through association with the EU than bilateral engagement. 66 Another example concerned EU-USA relations. 67 On matters of strategic dialogue with the US, the UK benefitted from the EU's collective diplomatic weight to assert its foreign policy positions on -for instance -the desirability of a code of conduct between ASEAN and China over the South China Sea. 68 The CFSP's structural distinctiveness received little attention. That no bright line separated CFSP matters from external action was hailed as indicating comprehensiveness of EU action on the international plane. 69 The government exerted a creditable attempt in the 2012 Review to review the balance between an independent conduct of British foreign relations and CFSP cooperationonly if we accept its characterisation in political terms of the CFSP as a multiplier for British interests. But in legal terms, at least on foreign relations, the Reports did not assess how far, nearly five years after the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force, the CFSP within a single EU framework is still subject to international legal methods.
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The European Commission has insisted that the EU's "internal order" is separate from international law and the relationship between EU and its member states are governed by EU law, a "distinct source of law." 71 This observation about the supremacy of EU law is not new but the claim about its separateness from international law is another -and more controvertiblematter. This is because now the EU also has "important law-based foreign relations powers that have a tendency to develop over time," 72 which a previous British Government claimed to have safeguarded when it ratified the Lisbon Treaty for the UK. 73 Against this background, it is clear that the Reports did not (want to) address implications for the UK's independent conduct of foreign relations when the CFSP's intergovernmental character is increasingly enmeshed into the requirements for greater (and apparent) institutional coherence of a single EU framework.
Recall that "competence" was broadly defined by the government as "everything of EU law" that affected the UK. It also acknowledged as "wide-ranging" the EU's potential competence to act in foreign affairs": 74 but except a concise account of the complex connection between TEU and TFEU provisions, there was scant analysis of its legal consequences for the UK. 75 Still more strikingly, the CJEU's increasingly crucial -and politicised -role in defining the boundaries of competences between the EU and member states were recognised, though tersely, and without elucidation.
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C. Case Study 2: European Union Act 2011 (2011 Act) A complex and technical statute, 77 the 2011 Act appeared to address the same matter of reviewing the CFSP's intergovernmental character as an aspect of British conduct of its independent foreign relations. The government adopted a different approach, in a "harder" form of primary legislation. Through a hierarchy of referenda "locks," the government aimed in this Act to improve accountability by changing the way it agreed, on behalf of the UK, to EU Treaty changes or decisions.
78 "Extensions" of CFSP competences through treaty changes or decisions may not be agreed by the government, without some degree of parliamentary scrutiny or even public approval in a plebiscite. Despite the form, its emphasis on (an "extension" of) competence is circumscribed. A narrow meaning of an "extension" in CFSP competence was adopted in the 2011 Act, occurring only upon an express amendment of the TFEU, which triggers the referendum requirement under Section 2(1).
79 Because (the government argued) competences were expressly granted by member states to the EU in the TFEU, and since EU bodies could only act within those areas of competences, an "extension" only occurs when there are express amendments to those already conferred by member states in the TFEU. 80 We must also be mindful that the 2011 Act is inapplicable if the government, exercising its prerogative, were to reject such Treaty changes at the outset. 81 The government insisted that an "extension" within the 2011 Act did not include the CJEU's role in interpreting CFSP competences, and dismissed concerns about its ability for activism in bolstering the EU's role as an international legal person. 82 In this respect, Section 4(f)(ii) is a curious provision, which states: 4 Cases where treaty or Article 48(6) 83 decision attracts a referendum (f) the extension of the competence of the EU in relation to-(ii) common foreign and security policy;
Because the TFEU only determined the fact and not type of competence for the CFSP, it is not easy to see how Section 4(f)(ii) would be applied to trigger a referendum. Article 40 TEU preserved the CFSP's competence from other competences, namely Articles 3 to 6 TFEU. Any consequent attempt to protect CFSP competences, under Article 40 TEU, must necessarily entail an articulation of what it is in relation to other EU competences, which have been defined in the TFEUineluctably a task for the CJEU. How does one assess within the 2011 Act whether an "extension" (2010-11) ; id. at paras. 37-38 (FCO written evidence in this report). 83 Art. 48(6) TEU allows for revision to Part 3 of the TFEU, which relates to EU internal policies action. These decisions are "simplified revision procedures" because it does not require an intergovernmental conference and are regarded as "greasing the wheels of EU integration" procedures. HL SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION; (13TH REPORT), EUROPEAN UNION BILL 6 (2010-11). of a CFSP competence had occurred, when its competence had not been defined in the TFEU, and that any prospective meaning ascribed to it by the CJEU is excluded?
A silver lining exists in Section 5(3). The executive must make a "required statement" whether in the "Minister's opinion," the treaty change falls under Section 4. 84 The "extension" of CFSP competence under the 2011 Act (if at all) is one matter; but perhaps Section 5(3) might offer more parliamentary scrutiny over the government's conduct of foreign relations in the CFSP. A government is presumed to be fallible and therefore accountable. 85 When necessary, Parliament can plausibly invoke Section 5(3) to elicit a formal legal position on the CFSP's (evolving) competence from the government. To the extent that the CFSP is subject to international legal methods, the government's statement under Section 5(3) will form the UK's interpretation of CFSP competence, which might be relevant as supplementary means of interpretation on the international plane.
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The 2011 Act is an exemplar of the government's considerable institutional advantage in conducting foreign relations, compared to the coordinate organs of state. Under Section 4(4)(a) referenda is averted if a treaty change or decision merely involves the codification of practice in the TEU or TFEU, which relates to the previous exercise of an existing competence. 87 Obviously, in matters of foreign relations it would be the government that is well-placed, with its vital access to diplomatic resources and legal advice, to determine any such codification.
To assure Parliament that Section 4(4)(a) would be applied in good faith, the government introduced the words "genuine" and "simple" to differentiate the type of codifications. "Genuine" codifications are not "extensions" under the 2011 Act, and therefore exempt from a referendum.
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Article 189 TFEU was used as an example. 89 This provision formed the legal basis for a European space policy, "not a simple codification," and would trigger a referendum because the previous competence 90 for the Galileo programme was based on a general provision on research and technological development. 91 Contrarily, provision of macro-financial assistance to Albania was a "simple" (i.e., "genuine") example of codification under the 2011 Act.
92 Funds were first dispersed in 2004 under Article 352 TFEU. This enabling clause was used a further seven times to provide similar assistance to other states. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty codified this practice in Articles 212 and 213 TFEU to cover economic, financial and technical cooperation with third states. 93 Parliament perceptively observed that it is more likely that competing interpretations of "codifications" under Section 4(4)(a) would be resolved in favour of EU institutions. 94 To recapitulate: both case studies, the 2012 Review and 2011 Act, represented efforts by the government to review, since the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force, the CFSP's intergovernmental character as an aspect of its continued but independent conduct of British foreign relations. To ensure maximum flexibility for the exercise of its prerogative in foreign relations, these actions were calibrated in terms of form and emphasis. Unless Parliament is resolved to obtain independent legal advice for the purposes in the 2011 Act, the government would remain most able to monitor any codification of practice. It is the executive branch's assessment (i.e., the required statement, of whether they are genuine or simple codifications) on which Parliament generally depend. On the other hand, the 2012 Review is a governmental document that collected selective facts about the nature of CFSP competences and its political advantages for British foreign policy. Though the evidence might constitute a vital aid to foreign policy-making, this is neither an inevitable outcome nor realistic possibility, at least after the General Election in 2015. 84 I.e., includes sec. 4(f)(ii 
III. BALANCING THE CFSP'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL CHARACTER WITHIN A SINGLE EU FRAMEWORK A. Current UK foreign policy concerning Southeast Asia
There has been a recrudescence of British diplomatic interest in Southeast Asia under the government of Prime Minister David Cameron. 95 The government's energetic conduct of foreign relations with the region of Southeast Asia sought to advance its national interests, 96 with a focus on generating prosperity for the UK. 97 There is recognition that an economic balance of power had shifted in favour of the emerging powers in Southeast Asia. Diplomatic engagement with the region must be meaningful and substantive and go beyond the characteristic impulse to balance the influence of Japan and China as regional powers.
98 Its accession to the TAC must be understood in this context. The Foreign Secretary disavowed any prospect of "outsourcing" its foreign policy to the European External Action Service. 99 British interests would not be advanced on its behalf by others. 100 Where there are common goals, however, the CFSP is regarded by the government as exerting a multiplier effect to benefit British interests.
101 This is why it agreed to a parallel accession (i.e., both as EU member state and sovereign state) to the TAC. As evidenced in the 2012 Review, the UK is confident of its latitude to enter alliances (with the EU, or not) to sustain its diplomatic objectives. 102 On this basis, its exercise of the prerogative is still unconstrained even if a conflict arises between the UK's specific foreign relations goals and CFSP cooperation within the (apparent) institutional coherence of a single EU framework. This is possibly less the unassailable position than it once was because of the potential interlocking of UK law, EU law and international law, which the rest of this section explains.
B. The TAC as lex specialis and its potential interlocking with UK and EU law
The TAC is a foundational treaty of ASEAN. 103 It established a binding -and regional -code of conduct in treaty form to govern inter-state relations in Southeast Asia. 104 During the Cold War, this marked an indigenous attempt by non-communist ASEAN member states to develop friendly relations with communist non-ASEAN states (particularly Vietnam), and to fashion a minimum legal standard of peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia. Quite possibly, the code of conduct first found expression in an early document 105 related to the ASEAN Declaration of a Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, which preceded the conclusion of the TAC. 106 More pertinently, it was in this document that the prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of a state ("nonintervention principle" 107 ) featured prominently as an ingredient of an ASEAN code of conduct. Most importantly, its adoption as Articles 2 and 10 TAC, 109 reflected consent in treaty form by ASEAN member states to a specific aim of proscribing non-intervention in their internal affairs, forged during the Cold War, but derived validity from general international law. Subject to what would be written shortly, this is a form of regional lex specialis: a legal technique of resolving apparent conflicts between differing but potentially applicable rules or principles.
110 ASEAN member states had consistently endorsed the TAC as a code of conduct for peaceful inter-state relations, 111 an expression which it is argued here constitutes subsequent practice under the General Rule of the Vienna Convention.
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The significance of the code of conduct is also supported by ASEAN's practice of accession to the TAC, a precondition of admission as a member state to the organisation. 113 A regional pattern of acceptable inter-state conduct had been established to proscribe intervention in each other's internal affairs, opposable to states in Southeast Asia. 114 Canonical principles of international law are embedded in this code of conduct: the sovereign equality of states; 115 territorial integrity of states;
116 and pacific settlement of disputes. 117 The TAC as a code of conduct, of which the nonintervention principle is a component, supports international law by facilitating stable, friendly relations in Southeast Asia on a multilateral basis with sovereign states.
For these reasons, accession to the TAC by non-ASEAN states 118 had long been urged by ASEAN member states. It would reflect in treaty form firm commitment to "ASEAN values" (i.e., its code of conduct in inter-state relations) and engagement with Southeast Asia. It is unlikely to constitute subsequent practice 119 in the absence of consistent acceptance 120 by the UK and EU, as non-ASEAN parties. As supplementary means, however, accession by the UK and EU to the TAC suggests that there is legal recourse to the code of conduct as confirmation 121 of the non-intervention principle's meaning. The principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation also requires that the ASEAN code of conduct be given meaning, by taking into account the object and purpose 122 of the TAC in maintaining peaceful inter-state relations within Southeast Asia. In short, there exists the potential for derogation from general international law or EU law because the TAC has normative priority as a form of regional lex specialis.
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Different (though also related) consequences potentially arise for the UK, with implications for its independent conduct of British foreign policy. Through its parallel accession, the UK has to balance this independence preserved by the CFSP's intergovernmental character, with its obligations under EU law to conduct the CFSP under the (semblance of) institutional coherence within a single EU structure. And it is the normative, liberal-meliorist values of EU external action as contained in the TEU and TFEU, potentially in conflict with the TAC's code of conduct as lex specialis, on which we assess the enmeshing of the CFSP within a single EU structure and the 109 Respectively, art. 2(c) and art. 10 state: "Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another" and "Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party" [emphasis added]. For dates of accession to the TAC before admission as ASEAN member states, see Seah, supra note 103, at n.42.
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See infra Section V for elucidation of the content of "internal affairs," which is proscribed by the non-intervention principle. 115 Art. 2(a) TAC. This has also included accession by other subjects of international law such as the EU, as an international organisation.
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Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 31(3)(b).
120
On consistency of acts to establish agreement of subsequent practice, see Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, 12-13.
121
Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 32.
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Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Merits, 1994 I.C.J. 6, paras. 51-52. UK's independent conduct of its foreign relations. This is the background to the legal issues that emerge from accession by the UK and EU to the TAC, to which we now turn.
C. Parallel accession by the UK to the TAC: Dominance of the British Government in the conduct of UK's foreign relations with Southeast Asia To begin with, the TAC had already been laid before Parliament in 2007 by a previous government.
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That was intended to be an accession by the UK but the Labour Government decided against it, then partly influenced by less than handsome relations with Myanmar. 125 In 2012, the TAC was again laid before Parliament, under a separate command paper. 126 There was no scrutiny of the TAC for the UK's interests before its Foreign Affairs Committee. Instead, Parliament was indirectly apprised of the government's motivations for accession to the TAC for the UK, 127 through scrutiny of the EU's accession to the same treaty.
128 Finiteness of parliamentary time was undoubtedly a practical constraint. Inevitably salient questions that particularly bear upon the UK's accession were not raised before the European Scrutiny Committee.
129 It was not clear, for example, whether the government made interpretative declarations to the TAC on behalf of the UK. Other non-ASEAN states such as Australia and the United States had expressly excluded their legal obligations connected to the non-intervention principle in the TAC.
130 Though the present government did not directly address the matter of interpretative declarations, the explanatory memorandum (EM) of 2007 suggested that, upon accession, formal understandings would be communicated to ASEAN to clarify the UK's interpretation of the TAC.
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The government's invocation of a scrutiny override underscored its institutional advantage in conducting foreign relations. Before Parliament formally considered this accession, the government had already agreed to the EU's accession to the TAC, as befitting its entitlement under the prerogative. Consequently the EU acceded on July 12, 2012; whereas Parliament only debated the accession on September 4, 2012. The FCO Minister explained that the government had deemed an override necessary because if the EU accession were delayed (by the UK Parliament), that would be inimical to British interests bilaterally with ASEAN and multilaterally within the EU.
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The matter of CFSP competences exercised Parliament. It sought clarifications from the government whether -and to what extent -the UK had retained its "competences" under the prerogative of foreign relations: that is to say, the bundle of broadly undefined powers related to conducting foreign relations, for which the EU might also exercise as a competence under Title V of TEU, i.e., CFSP. 133 Parliamentary scrutiny was lackadaisical. Either because Parliament was unable or unwilling, it did not frame the debate usefully by raising the "technical" legal questions. For instance, the Council Decision of April 2012 that approved TAC accession by the EU was not purely a CFSP act. 134 Articles 37 135 and 31 136 TEU were applied together, which contained the CFSP component in this decision. But external action was invoked: Article 209(2) TFEU 137 enabled the Union to conclude "any agreement" (i.e., TAC) to achieve the objectives in Article 21 TEU 138 Under "reservations and declarations" of the 2007 EM, the UK would upon accession record the following "understandings" that the TAC: (i) does not affect the UK's rights and obligations in other bilateral or multilateral agreements; (ii) must be interpreted in conformity with the UN Charter; (iii) will not apply to or affect the UK's relations with states outside Southeast Asia. 2007, Cm. 7196, supra note 124. 154 Perhaps because of the geographical distance between the EU and Southeast Asia, the scope of EU actions is limited. First, to make good its non-existent political role in Southeast Asia, 155 the EU has been providing technical assistance to ASEAN. 156 This supplied the basis to deepen trade links and thus balance the regional influence of Japan and China.
157 Second, EU actions are innately normative as befits the CFSP's objectives of promoting a set of EU values which it is encouraged as worthy of wider application by less democratic states in the Third World (human rights, for instance).
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It is against this background that we examine the apparent rapprochement between the EU and Myanmar.
159 Previously the EU had registered its opprobrium against an absence of democracy in Myanmar and serious breaches of human rights by its government through restrictive measures. 160 These were punitive though mainly ineffective 161 sanctions that targeted members of the military government or its affiliates. 162 Though ineffective in reality, there was no doubting its normative high-mindedness as expressed through the CFSP, which said: " . . . the restrictive measures . . . are instrumental in promoting respect for fundamental human rights and thus serve the purpose of protecting public morals." 163 No foreign policy can be entirely devoid of normativity. That the common European policy as it exists in the CFSP articulates an understanding of democratic participation to contain particular requirements of inclusivity, an implication that it is ultimately desirable for regional and international relations, is reflected in the 2010 restrictive measure: " . . . the absence of substantive progress towards an inclusive democratisation process, notwithstanding the promulgation of a new electoral law and the announcement of the Government of Burma/Myanmar of multi-party elections to be held in 2010 . . . ." 164 As for EU member states, they may not act contrary to the restrictive measures which are " . . . incompatible with the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, which are common to the Member States." restrictive measures are still normative in nature: to disable the Myanmar Government's capacity to carry out "internal repression" by prohibiting technical or financial assistance related to military activities and equipment, save for uses concerning humanitarian purposes. 168 Because these democratic principles underpin the single EU framework, the CFSP's normativity has some legal basis which potentially involves the CJEU through judicial review under Article 275 TFEU. Therefore, this section uses the restrictive measure against Myanmar as a case study to illustrate potential areas of difficulties for the independent exercise of foreign relations (and the CFSP as an aspect of its prerogative) by the British Government, through the interlocking of EU law, UK law and international law.
B. The involvement of the CJEU in CFSP matters through judicial review of restrictive measures The legality of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons is subject to review by the CJEU -one of two (new) exceptions, after the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force, to its lack of jurisdiction in CFSP matters. 169 Restrictive measures, such as those against Myanmar, are adopted pursuant to a CFSP measure by the Council; followed by the Council agreeing a regulation, acting by qualified majority, on a joint proposal of the High Representative of the EU and Commission.
170
This two-step system highlighted the CFSP's intergovernmental character by preserving member states' capacity to conduct foreign relations on their own terms, if they wished. Now this is potentially being eroded by Article 275 TFEU. That the EU has "important law-based foreign relations powers," as the European Commission had commented, which have a "tendency to develop over time" is an observation of some salience. 171 Article 275 TFEU directly empowers the CJEU to review an annulment action against a restrictive measure for illegality.
172 It assigns to the CJEU the task of monitoring boundaries between CFSP and other EU competences, under Article 40 TEU. Its procedural status as a direct action prompts another question: is there a concomitant jurisdiction in Article 267 TFEU, an "implied" conferral of competence, on the CJEU to give preliminary rulings on the validity of restrictive measures? 173 A key question, not conclusively decided despite the CFSP's structural distinctiveness, is the issues of high policy which are putatively justiciable before the CJEU. These issues bear upon the conferral of competences to EU bodies (i.e., CJEU) which legitimately constitute "everything deriving from EU law that affects what happens in the UK."
174 They deserved careful attention but were omitted in the 2012 Review and 2011 Act.
As a legal person, a sanctioned state like Myanmar 175 is able to challenge the legality of the 2013 restrictive measures, 176 on grounds of proportionality. Whether the condition of standing is satisfied under Article 263(4) TFEU is a matter of legal submission before the CJEU -a formidable hurdle, 177 but not the key point here. It is the availability of legal avenues for legal persons to challenge matters of high policy that is in point, much less the outcome or political reality of seeking judicial review.
Not only is proportionality a general principle of EU law, it is also an established ground of judicial review.
178 By lifting its previous restrictive measures, the 2013 sanction intended as an objective to encourage the Myanmar Government to continue its policies, which in the EU's On this point, see infra note. 176 Art. 275, second paragraph TFEU. 177 For requirement of legal or natural persons to demonstrate the restrictive measure is of "direct concern" and does not entail implementing measures (i.e., regulation), see Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95. 178 Art. 5(4) TEU; TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136 (2d ed., 2006). particular force in UK law. It is much easier to state that the non-intervention principle reflects customary international law, 198 but much harder to pin down the content of "internal affairs," to which this principle applies. And if we accept that the TAC had established a regional lex specialis, then, does the non-intervention principle in Article 10 offer stronger protection against encroachments to the internal affairs of ASEAN member states, compared to customary international law? It is fortunate that we might avoid these considerations in UK law. As an unincorporated treaty and thus devoid of a domestic foothold in UK law, 199 accession to the TAC, which does not confer rights on individuals, 200 was only intended to be politically meaningful for enhancing relations between the EU, UK and ASEAN. 201 To emphasise this point, the government cited as an example the suspension of EU "smart sanctions" 202 against Myanmar in April 2012, explaining that during the decision making Article 10 TAC "did not feature in any way." 203 Furthermore, UK relations with Myanmar -whether bilaterally or within the EU -plausibly fall within the strategic fields of foreign policy, for which UK courts acknowledge the government's special responsibility 204 and on these matters strive to speak with the same voice as the executive branch. 205 the European Parliament about the process of concluding this agreement under Article 218(10) TFEU. Therefore, Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP was annulled for breaching the procedural requirement under Article 218(10) TFEU, which reflected the "fundamental democratic principle" that the decision-making process concerning EU external action must be scrutinised by the European population through Parliament as its representative intermediary. 224 Thus there exists awkward prospects for EU-ASEAN (and UK-ASEAN) political relations if judicial determinations yield a finding of incompatibility between the ADHR and general principles of EU law, especially its Charter of Fundamental Freedoms. Consider this alternative scenario. If the restrictive measure were ruled disproportionate by the CJEU because the prohibitions do not respect Myanmar's primary responsibility in protecting fundamental freedoms, is it incompatible with the EU's normative (and possibly differing) standard of protecting similar rights under international law in a non-restrictive and adverse manner?
225 Therefore, how extensive is a court's role as decision maker in high policy concerning CFSP matters within a single EU framework, though still an aspect of the independent conduct of British foreign relations? 226 On this matter, both the CJEU and UK courts have been similarly engaged but they are not similarly disposed in terms of ascertaining the "legal edge" between executive and judicial functions. 228 When Denza reappraised this matter again in 2004, the attempts by member states to provide for the CFSP's intergovernmental character were no longer described as drawing "a clear line in the sand" but instead "lines in the sand".
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To this extent, this article has provided an account of how one EU member state in particularthe UK -has attempted to make sense of and enforce these "lines in the sand," as an aspect of their independent conduct of foreign relations. It instanced two case studies (the 2011 Act and 2012 Review) to illustrate the general and somewhat conceptual approach of the British Government in preserving the CFSP's intergovernmental nature. Next, the UK's parallel accession to the TAC aimed, as another case study, to show a specific approach of the government to address the pressures of balancing the CFSP's intergovernmental character with the added demands of conducting CFSP coherently within a single EU framework. Finally, this article attempted to predict potential difficulties of drawing these "lines in the sand" by exploring how UK law, EU law and international law can potentially interlock, which results from the parallel accession by the UK. The normativity of CFSP actions in faraway geographical zones, such as Southeast Asia, and its prospective basis for judicial review by the CJEU are also considered, with implications for the flexibility with which a British Government might wish to conduct its own foreign relations (perhaps deviating from CFSP values) with this region.
If we accept the general presumption that a government is fallible and should be held to account (these days it seems increasingly anomalous to presume otherwise), 230 then it is remarkable how the conduct of the CFSP as an intergovernmental act within the single EU framework continues to be dominated by the British Government and largely on its own terms within the UK. Equally, for all its normative high-mindedness, a union that is meaningfully founded on particular values 231 of equality 232 and the rule of law 233 could not base its CFSP on these amorphous "lines in the sand," leaving open an avenue for the CJEU to review EU acts for legality, 224 Id. at para. 81. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 85. 231 Art. 3 TEU. 232 Art. 2 TEU. 233 whereas the UK courts are more diffident and less likely to enter areas encroaching on a "forbidden territory." If accountability in the conduct of British foreign relations improves because of the CJEU's involvement at its base in Luxembourg, a consequence of the UK's legal obligations under the CFSP, it follows that we should reflect on the state of democratic governance in the UK.
